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Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Rafael David Sherman 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. RAFAEL DAVID SHERMAN (“Plaintiff”), individually, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, brings this First Amended Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, 
and any other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of 
RAFAEL DAVID SHERMAN, 
individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated,  
                          
Plaintiffs, 
                                   
                             v.                                                                 
   
YAHOO! INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
     
                           Defendant. 
 
 
Case No.:   
 
CLASS ACTION 
 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO 
THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET 
SEQ. 
 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
'13CV0041 WVGGPC
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YAHOO! INC. (“YAHOO” or “Defendant”), in negligently and/or intentionally 
contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, in violation of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., (“TCPA”), thereby invading 
Plaintiff’s privacy. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to himself and 
his own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, 
including investigation conducted by his attorneys. 
 
2. The TCPA was designed to prevent calls like the ones described within this complaint, 
and to protect the privacy of citizens like Plaintiff. “Voluminous consumer complaints 
about abuses of telephone technology – for example, computerized calls dispatched to 
private homes – prompted Congress to pass the TCPA.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 
132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).  
3. In enacting the TCPA, Congress intended to give consumers a choice as to how creditors 
and telemarketers may call them, and made specific findings that “[t]echnologies that 
might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally available, are 
costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer.    
TCPA, Pub.L. No. 102–243, § 11. Toward this end, Congress found that: 
[b]anning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the 
home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the 
call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation 
affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only 
effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this 
nuisance and privacy invasion. 
 
Id. at § 12; see also Martin v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, LLC, 2012 WL 
3292838, at* 4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing Congressional findings on TCPA’s 
purpose).  
4. Congress also specifically found that “the evidence presented to the Congress indicates 
that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless 
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of the type of call….” Id. at §§ 12-13. See also, Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 744.   
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. This Court has federal question jurisdiction because this case arises out of violation of 
federal law. 47 U.S.C. §227(b); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).  
6. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Plaintiff resides in this judicial district, the harm 
to Plaintiff occurred in this judicial district, and Defendant is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the County of San Diego, State of California because it conducts business 
there.  
PARTIES 
7. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a citizen and resident of the County of 
San Diego, State of California.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a 
“person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 
8. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant is, and at all times 
mentioned herein was, a corporation whose primary corporate address is in the State of 
Delaware.  Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Delaware corporation 
and is a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10).  Defendant provides 
communication services to hundreds of thousands of consumers. Plaintiff alleges that at 
all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in 
the County of San Diego, and within this judicial district. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California.  Plaintiff is, and at 
all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 
10. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Delaware corporation and a 
“person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 
11. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the 
County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 
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12. YAHOO offers its users an Instant Messaging service that provides users the opportunity 
to send a free text message/s. 
13. At no time did Plaintiff provide Plaintiff’s cellular phone number to Defendant through 
any medium. 
14. On or about January 7, 2013, at approximately 11:07 a.m. (PST), a YAHOO user utilized 
YAHOO’s service to send a text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. This text 
message, which was unsolicited by Plaintiff, read: 
“hey get online i have to talk to you.” [hereinafter “MESSAGE”] 
15. Prior to the MESSAGE being received by Plaintiff, YAHOO sent an unsolicited SPAM 
text message to Plaintiff (on its own accord) on or about the same day at approximately 
11:07 a.m. (PST). This text message read: 
“A Yahoo! User has sent you a message. Reply to that SMS to 
respond. Reply INFO to this SMS for help or go to y.ahoo.it/ 
imsms.” [hereinafter “SPAM”]. 
16. Plaintiff was unaware that YAHOO’s Instant Messaging service would send him the 
unsolicited SPAM text message described in Paragraph 15 of this Complaint. In fact, on 
good information and belief, the sender of the MESSAGE was also unaware that 
YAHOO would send the SPAM text. 
17. Through this conduct, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone 
regarding an unsolicited service via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) 
as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 
18. This ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a 
random or sequential number generator. 
19. The telephone number Defendant called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for 
which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 
20. These telephone calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined 
by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 
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21. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant or its agent prior express consent to receive calls, 
including unsolicited calls, to his cellular telephone, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 
(b)(1)(A).  
22. The telephone call by Defendant, or its agent, described in Paragraph 15 of this 
Complaint, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated (“the Class”). 
24. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: “all persons within the 
United States who received a text message substantially similar or identical to the text 
message described in Paragraph 15 of this Complaint from Defendant without prior 
express consent, which message by Defendant or its agents was not made for emergency 
purposes, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint.” 
25. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class.  Plaintiff does not 
know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the 
tens of thousands, if not more.  Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to 
assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 
26. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the 
following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted 
Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an unsolicited 
SPAM text messages, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain 
cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the 
Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class 
members.  Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 
27. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on 
behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal 
injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or expand the 
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Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are 
learned in further investigation and discovery. 
28. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the 
Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The 
Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 
29. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved 
affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class 
predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including, but 
not limited to, the following: 
a) Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or 
its agents sent any unsolicited text message/s to the Class (other than a message 
made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called 
party) to a Class member using any automatic dialing and/or SMS texting system 
to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service;  
b) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of 
damages for such violation; and  
c) Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such 
conduct in the future.  
d) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to any other relief. 
30. As a person who received at least one unsolicited SPAM text message without Plaintiff’s 
prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class.  Plaintiff 
will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff 
has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class.   
31. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the 
Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will 
continue to face the potential for irreparable harm.  In addition, these violations of law 
will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such 
Case 3:13-cv-00041-GPC-WVG   Document 1   Filed 01/08/13   Page 6 of 9
 COMPLAINT PAGE 7 OF 9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
K
A
Z
E
R
O
U
N
I 
L
A
W
 G
R
O
U
P
, A
P
C
 
27
00
 N
. M
ai
n 
St
re
et
, S
te
. 1
00
0 
Sa
nt
a 
A
na
, C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 9
27
05
 
 
illegal conduct.  Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, 
Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 
32. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims 
involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 
33. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this 
controversy.  Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with 
federal and California law.  The interest of Class members in individually controlling the 
prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory 
damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal.  Management of 
these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in 
many class claims.  
34. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the 
Class as a whole. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 
35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as 
though fully stated herein. 
36. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple 
negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the 
above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 
37. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and 
The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every 
violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 
38. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such 
conduct in the future. 
// 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE 
TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 
39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as 
though fully stated herein. 
40. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple 
knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and 
every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 
41. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., 
Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for 
each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(3)(C). 
42. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such 
conduct in the future. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff and the Class members the 
following relief against Defendant: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF  
THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 
• As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff 
seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and 
every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 
• Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the 
future. 
• Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 
// 
// 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF  
THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 
• As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), 
Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for 
each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 
• Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the 
future. 
• Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 
TRIAL BY JURY 
43. Pursuant to the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, 
Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. 
 
Dated: January 8, 2013 Respectfully submitted, 
 
                                                                                KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC 
 
 
By: __/s/ Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.   
 ABBAS KAZEROUNIAN 
                                                                                                   ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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